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I

ABSTRACT: The concept of hybrid war has evolved from operational-level use of
military means and methods in war toward strategic-level use of nonmilitary means
in a gray zone below the threshold of war. This article considers this evolution and
its implications for strategy and the military profession by contrasting past and
current use of the hybrid war concept and raising critical questions for policy and
military practitioners.

n a 2005 article coauthored with James Mattis and in his 2007 analysis,
Frank Hoffman envisaged the “rise of hybrid wars.” According to Hoffman, these
wars involved the mixing of different methods and means and combined regular,
irregular, and criminal elements with terrorism and new technologies. This variety
of means and ways was expected to lead to positive synergy effects for those waging
war.1 In addition, converging modes of war and increasing complexity would result
in an increased threat to those targeted.2
Hoffman’s idea of hybrid war built on two ideal types of war: regular and irregular,
which fused together into a hybrid variant. The two previous ideal types are already
questionable since the regular interstate variant has long been the exception.3 Even
the Cold War remained cold because both superpowers sought to avoid escalation
that could lead to nuclear war. While the Cold War offers excellent examples of the
combined use of various military and non-military methods and means, this combined
use takes place in virtually all wars.4 In the end, the hybrid buzzword appeared most

The author would like to thank Kevin Köhler, Babak RezaeeDaryakenari, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, and other
participants of the Leiden University Workshop in Political Science (where an earlier draft of this paper was presented
in November 2020) and colleagues Jan Ångström, Magnus Christiansson, and Oscar Jonsson for their constructive
comments. The writing of this article has been supported by The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the
Swedish Defence University through its Officers’ Programme Development Project. The views expressed in this article,
however, are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings, November
2005, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars; and Frank G.
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies, 2007).
2. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2009): 34–39.
3.
M. L. R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,” Review of
International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 19–37; and Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative
Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2016).
4. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient
World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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useful if it resulted in more analytical thinking about war and warfare or how it is
waged.5 Unfortunately, this is not what happened.
While the hybrid war concept received some initial attention, its breakthrough
came in 2014 with the Russian occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula
from Ukraine. Hybrid warfare was immediately linked to a now-famous speech
by General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces of
Russia, to the extent that it became used interchangeably with a(n entirely mythical)
doctrine named after him. In the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit, hybrid
warfare was discussed alongside Russian aggression.6 These developments caused
Hoffman’s original concept that already rested on shaky analytical grounds to start
evolving to a problematic direction. Hybrid war now became synonymous with Russia
rather than nonstate actors and was seen as the most immediate security threat for the
West.7 This evolution turned hybrid war into an ambiguous catchall concept, which
constantly risks reinventing the wheel. While this plasticity makes the buzzword
useful in policy and public discussions, the lack of precision hinders its use for scholarly
and policy purposes. Without a precise definition, hybrid war risks saying both
everything and nothing in a way prone to hindering a better understanding of
contemporary war and warfare.8
Contemporary research has failed to acknowledge the evolution of hybrid war
from Hoffman’s more precise definition to the catchall it has become today. This article
argues that the problem of defining hybrid war is not merely an analytical one. As the
concept essentially tries to come to terms with a more comprehensive understanding of
war, immediate real-world implications for strategy and the military profession arise.
The first part of the article describes the evolution of the concept toward gray
zone conflict; the contemporary understanding of hybrid war has moved away from
the operational level use of military means and methods into the strategic realm. The
evolved hybrid war has become a synonym for gray zone conflict with both terms
typically referring to Russian action in a way that hinders more general analysis.
The second part of the article focuses on the main issue at stake, of the elevation
of nonmilitary means over military ones. From the perspective of strategic theory that
focuses on the relationship between ends, means, and ways, hybrid war indicates the
5.
David Betz, “The Idea of Hybridity,” in Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare: New Labels, Old
Politics, ed. Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, and James C. Pearce (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2019), 9–24.
6. “Wales Summit Declaration” (press release, NATO, August 30, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_112964.htm
7. Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018).
8. John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” PRISM 7, no. 3 (2018):
118–29; Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017); Mark Galeotti,
Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (New York: Routledge, 2019); and Donald Stoker and
Craig Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic
Thinking,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (2020): 13–48.
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insufficiency of narrow military strategy that focuses on use of force as a threat or as
actual employment of violence.
The third part of the article discusses the implications for the military profession.
Regardless of what the phenomenon is called, contemporary conflict is perceived to
have shifted from the narrow military domain. What does this shift away from use of
force mean for the military profession, which has traditionally focused on managing
and meting out death and destruction? The article concludes by exploring the centrality
of these questions for policymakers and military practitioners.

Evolution of Hybrid War to Gray Zone Conflict
The concept of hybrid war has constantly evolved. The concept dates to 1998
when it was used to describe the combination of conventional forces with special
forces.9 Whereas Hoffman’s understanding of hybrid war focused on mixing
regular and irregular means and methods on the operational level during war,
the Russian invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014
caused practitioners to broaden the description. This almost bloodless operation
was interpreted through Gerasimov’s prescient, if not prophetic, speech printed a
year earlier in February 2013.10 Although Gerasimov did not mention the words
hybrid or Ukraine, his speech was soon interpreted as a Russian “Gerasimov
doctrine” of hybrid war.11 According to Gerasimov, nonmilitary means can be
used to ignite an armed conflict in a previously flourishing state that justifies a
decisive intervention by foreign forces.12 The resulting gray zone conflict waged
under the threshold of war bears more resemblance to the strategic-level use
of nonmilitary means than either traditional war or Hoffman’s hybrid variant.
Gerasimov and gray zone conflict thus envisage a shift from use of force in war to
use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war.
While the interpretation of a Gerasimov doctrine was incorrect, it proved
politically helpful after the exhausting wars waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. Russian aggression against Georgia and Ukraine and more limited
operations elsewhere have contributed to the belief that Russia poses the greatest
and most immediate security threat for the Western countries. The Russian
threat was familiar to many politicians and armed forces. This threat was
also politically convenient since it allowed the focus to shift from a costly and
uncomfortable war on terror to what some observers immediately understood as a
renewed Cold War.
9. Robert G. Walker, Spec Fi: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations (thesis, Monterey, CA:
Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA359694.pdf.
10. Originally published in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February 27, 2013.
11. Mark Galeotti, “The Mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and the Language of Threat,” Critical Studies on
Security 7, no. 2 (2019): 157–61.
12. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24, 27.
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Politics aside, there are two reasons why equating hybrid war with Russian
foreign policy is unfortunate. First, this equation lacks conceptual clarity and
skews the understanding of reality by connecting dots in what may be unwarranted
places. If only Russia wages hybrid war, it logically follows that hybrid war can
be studied through Russian actions. From this perspective, every action Russia
undertakes can constitute warfare.13 This reasoning helps little in understanding
a more general category of war applicable even to other actors. Empirically,
it is uncertain whether Russia achieved its goals on Crimea, where unique
circumstances allowed limited use of force.14 Understanding all Russian actions as
a part of a coordinated strategy will undoubtedly lead to hawkish overestimations
of the Russian threat and risk the development of poor strategy for countering real
dangers, including unnecessary escalation.15
The second issue with equating hybrid war with Russia is the assumption
hybrid war will always be initiated by an aggressive opponent, leaving everyone
else on the receiving end. This difference between the perceived need to become
better at strategy while reactively shielding ourselves from outside interference is a
crucial one; status quo actors seek to protect and maintain what they have, whereas
revisionist actors like Russia actively seek to attain change. The assumption that
only our adversaries possess active strategies betrays a limited understanding and
practice of strategy and a lack of urgency to master hybrid war.
Limitations in regard to strategy are perhaps best evident in the Afghanistan
War, which demonstrates how strategies narrowly focused on deployment of
force are bound to face difficulties. With national defense establishments focusing
on deterrence and maintenance of the status quo during the relatively stable
years of the Cold War, most countries lacked experience on how to change it
through warfare. The Russian occupation of Crimea came at the precise moment
when the withdrawal of most Western forces from Afghanistan confirmed
the counterinsurgency strategy had failed. Paradoxically, the concept of hybrid
war, which emphasizes combining different ways and means, allowed shifting
attention from the failure to do so in Afghanistan. In this way, the timing of
the Russian occupation of Crimea was opportune for Western militaries, which
never had to admit defeat against the Taliban. With an urgent new threat, there
was little pressure to draw lessons from the long war.
Gerasimov’s presentation can be understood to advocate the opposite course
of action and to take stock of past experiences. The cumbersome full title of the
presentation was “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges
13. Renz, Russia’s Military Revival.
14. Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/; and Renz, Russia’s Military
Revival.
15. Freedman, Future of War; and Renz, Russia’s Military Revival.
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Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat
Operations.”16 As can be expected, the core issue was emphasizing the crucial
role played by military science in understanding contemporary realities. Much of
the presentation focused on key lessons of several recent wars fought by Russia
and the United States. One lesson was that “the role of nonmilitary means
of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they
have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”17 A figure
attached to the presentation illustrated this new reality by proclaiming a current
“correlation of nonmilitary and military measures” at a “4:1” ratio.18
The efforts in Afghanistan, descriptions of hybrid war, and Gerasimov’s
portrayal of contemporary war bear more than cursory resemblance.
Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan too sought to combine different
military and nonmilitary means and ways to achieve positive synergy. In fact,
Gerasimov essentially repeated the classic counterinsurgency ratio of military
to nonmilitary means in a more general context that war consists of four-fifths
political action and one-fifth military action.19 Perhaps then, the main difference
between counterinsurgency and hybrid war is that we waged the former there,
while the latter targets us here? Is it possible that we are observing the same
kind of war, but that we are as unaccustomed to wage it as we are to experience it
waged against ourselves?
While it has since been emphasized that Gerasimov merely provided his
interpretation of the way Western countries wage war, the discrepancy between
our failures and perceived Russian successes in combining military with
nonmilitary means has been explained not only by skillful new strategy but also
by a superior Russian command and control system.20 Both explanations have
been criticized as “simply unrealistic.”21
To summarize, hybrid war and gray zone conflict suggest that success in
contemporary war depends on coordination and combination of military and
nonmilitary means. This is not a new argument and has been discussed at least
since the so-called Three Block War of the late 1990s.22 Neglecting to analyze
16. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the
Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review (January–February 2016): 24.
17. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24.
18. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 28.
19. For counterinsurgency, see David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International, 2006), 63.
20.
Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (January–February 2016): 36; Roger
N. McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 97–105; and Oscar
Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 28, no. 1 (2015): 21.
21. Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” Contemporary Politics 22, no. 3 (2016): 297.
22. For instance, see Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines
Magazine, January 1999, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA399413.pdf; and Rupert Smith, The Utility of
Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2008).
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our own experiences in places like Afghanistan and equating Russian action and
hybrid war have contributed to a poor understanding of Russia and how we can
combine various means and ways to achieve our desired political ends.
Associating hybrid war with Russia alone also reflects the absence
of a major rethinking of war and warfare in general even though the Afghanistan
War alone illustrates how we struggle to wage this kind of war ourselves. It is
equally difficult to see any major organizational reforms these new insights
have heralded, for instance the need to coordinate and combine military and
nonmilitary means. Considering that armed forces do not possess most of
the nonmilitary means emphasized by notions of hybrid warfare, it is
unsurprising that use of force and military technology have remained top priorities
even in Russia.23
As its title suggested, even Gerasimov’s speech focused on carrying out
combat operations and soon turned to high-tech capabilities, including artificial
intelligence and robots. Military professionals around the world still assume
the centrality of traditional military operations and above all the use of violence
in war. This kind of narrow military strategy does not correspond with the
emphasis in contemporary conflicts that has shifted from use of force in war to
use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war. The evolution of hybrid
war indicates that the current emphasis lies in a grand strategy that applies
all available means an actor possesses, not in narrow military strategy that focuses
on mere violence.

Political Warfare and Strategy
Strategy lies at the core of the military profession because it bridges war
and politics. Without this connection, war would be mere violence, and those
who wage war little more than murderers. From the strategy perspective, the
use of what has been called the “full spectrum,” that includes even nonviolent
means, should only be surprising if one perceives strategy and warfare
narrowly as predominantly belonging to a military domain.24
Continuing a long emphasis of combining various military and nonmilitary
means in Russian strategic thinking, Gerasimov explicitly avoided this pitfall
by noting that “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the
direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and
other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential
of the population.”25 As hybrid war evolved to overlap gray zone conflict, it
23.
24.
25.

Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” 291.
Hoffman, Conflict 21st Century, 5, 56.
Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24.
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simultaneously expanded from narrow military strategy to subsume broader
grand strategy in a manner reminiscent of political warfare waged during the
Cold War. This evolution indicates devaluation of the perceived utility of violence
in contemporary war and comes with immediate implications for strategy.
The centrality given to violence in Western military theory can be traced
to Clausewitz’s early-nineteenth-century writings. Despairing over his
contemporaries’ relative lack of interest about fighting, Clausewitz emphasized
violence in war to the point of elevating violence as the constant nature of war,
and he defined war as the use of force to make the enemy submit to our (political)
will.26 His definition of war paved the way for a military profession focused on a
single activity—applying violence to make the enemy defenseless.
This focus has endured, as illustrated by Harold Lasswell’s definition of
soldiers as “specialists on violence.”27 Samuel Huntington famously built on the
definition when he dubbed officers “managers of violence,” claimed that “the
function of a military force is successful armed combat,” and argued that the
military constitutes a profession.28 Huntington saw that effectiveness dictated
leaving military matters to professionals, who acted under “objective civilian
control.”29 The domain of the military profession thus constituted war and
warfare or use of violence in war.
This division is evident even in strategic theory. While the prefix military
to strategy explicitly refers to violence, most writings on strategy still depart
from Clausewitz’s writings. For Clausewitz, strategy was “the theory of the
use of combats for the object of the War,” and tactics “the theory of the use
of military forces in combat.”30 While grand strategy encompasses all means
actors may employ to achieve desired political ends, military strategy focuses
more narrowly on a subordinate level where military means and actors prevail.31
Military strategy, therefore, involves the use of force, which in turn forms one of
the means available for broader grand strategy.
Clausewitz’s influence is discernible even in attempts to make sense of
hostile activities in the gray zone below the threshold of war. This is the starting
26. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 1.
27. Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68.
28. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, rev. ed.
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 11.
29.
Huntington, Soldier and the State. For critical views, see Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, reprint (New York: Anchor Books, 2003); Suzanne C. Nielsen,
“American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier
and the State,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 369–76; and Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism:
Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44, no. 4 (Spring 2020): 7–44.
30. Clausewitz, On War, 66. Emphasis removed.
31. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017).
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point of George F. Kennan, the American diplomat best known for writing the
“long telegram” analysis of the Soviet political system. He defined political
warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.
In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at
a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”32 With his
definition and despite its age, Kennan succeeds in capturing gray zone conflict
better than many who write about the phenomenon today. Nevertheless, the
definition builds on potentially unstable conceptual foundations.
From the perspective of Clausewitz’s theory of war, political warfare is an
oxymoron.33 There are two reasons for this. First, considering Clausewitz’s
view of war as a continuation of politics by other means, the political prefix
makes little sense to warfare. For Clausewitz, all war and hence warfare is
inherently political. Considering the way Kennan believed “the realities of
international relations” to consist of “the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and
out of war,” the prefix political was likely chosen by Kennan to de-emphasize
violence and to move narrow military strategy toward broader grand strategy.
Political warfare in any case soon became a way to wage the Cold War in a
manner less likely to escalate to a nuclear exchange.
Second, if indeed all war is violent in the manner Clausewitz believed,
it is unlikely that he would have recognized activities that lack violence as
constituting war or warfare.34 While the evolution of hybrid war stemmed
from the emphasis given to nonviolent means, the gray zone furthermore
suggests these means are not employed during war or the traditional military
domain. Kennan’s political warfare departed from similar premises.
Appraisals of contemporary conflict which devalue violence have
immediate bearing for strategy: highlighting nonviolent means elevates
broader grand strategy at the cost of narrow military strategy. While it is
first and foremost Russian action that has fed into these theories, even other
past conflicts—including our own engagement in Afghanistan—illustrate
how military strategy and violence alone are unlikely to deliver wide-ranging
political goals. 35 In this regard, it is important to note that Clausewitz’s

32.
George F. Kennan, “Long Telegram,” Wilson Center Digital Archive, February 22, 1946,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf; and Office of the Historian, “269. Policy
Planning Staff Memorandum,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence
Establishment, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1996), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.
33. Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks,
July 28, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
34. See Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5–32.
35. Smith, Utility of Force.
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understanding of strategy has been criticized as focusing too much on what
is understood today as the operational level of war.36
Another criticism comes from the admission that the threat posed by
actors like Russia requires a more total defense than what armed forces
alone can provide. While total defense—the use of all available means in
the defense of a country and its interests—links back to grand strategy, this
thinking betrays the passive status quo assumption that it is others who
engage in what could be understood as a full-spectrum offensive.
The broadening of strategy to encompass nonmilitary means in ways
that potentially put them ahead of military means raises a troubling
question for military professionals. Regardless of the label used, many of the
activities ascribed to gray zone, hybrid war, and political warfare lie outside
the traditional military domain, or use of violence in war. How does the
devaluation of conventional warfare influence the military profession? In
other words, how will a profession that has so far focused narrowly on
managing death and destruction meet the new opportunities and threats?

Politics and the Military Profession
The Western military profession is founded on the ideal of its apolitical
nature. This emphasis is justified by the special remit of the profession—
use of violence. While necessary for protecting polities, militaries’ capacity
for violence raises the threat of militarism that endangers democracy. Violent
capacity allows not only maintaining political order, but also undemocratic
seizure of power. This type of loss of democratic political control was also
what Lasswell feared during World War II when he described “garrison states”
dominated by the military.37 As a result, militaries have been subjected to tight
political control and separated from and subordinated to democratic politics
when possible.38 This was Huntington’s solution, which envisaged a narrow
military domain that focuses on use of force and keeping the military separate
from politics.39
Huntington has since been accused of misunderstanding Clausewitz, who
according to a different reading rejected a politically neutral military that

36. Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2–4;
and Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd rev. and expanded ed. (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2001), 26.
37. Lasswell, “The Garrison State.”
38. Jan Willem Honig, “Military, War, and Politics,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences, 2nd ed., ed. James Wright (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2015), 518–23.
39. Huntington, Soldier and the State.
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waged compartmentalized war in isolation from the surrounding society.40 The
question of whether warfare can be thus compartmentalized highlights the two
understandings of strategy—broad grand strategy and narrow military strategy—
and ultimately begs the question of who owns war. This question of ownership
is entrenched in bureaucratic, normative, and legal frameworks. Ownership
comes with crucial ramifications, not least political ones. If war is mainly
understood to concern use of force, it belongs to the remit of the military profession
which, like all professions, seeks autonomy within its professional domain. Here
it is important to emphasize that one key reason why the concept of grand
strategy was invented was to assert that the political control of war remains in
civilian, not military, hands.41
If one believes the adherents of hybrid war and similar concepts, much of
contemporary conflict lies outside this traditional military domain, raising
fundamental questions for the military profession. If violence is devalued in
contemporary conflict, then what remains of the special remit of the military
profession? Must the profession reinvent itself by expanding its traditionally
narrow professional domain? Would interfering with existing boundaries lead to
conflict and clash with democratic civil-military relations as militaries inevitably
become involved in what must be considered political activities?
These questions are uncomfortable, yet necessary. It is not difficult to
imagine why they have often been avoided. Beginning with Clausewitz,
his focus on violence largely allowed him to prescribe the core activity of
the emerging military profession in a rather technical way that offered the
promise of bypassing politics. Clausewitz elevated violence to the guiding
principle of war and saw that wars are decided through violence; political
goals in war were best achieved by forcing enemies to their knees. This
belief required destroying enough of an enemy’s armed forces to make them
unable to defend themselves. After this, an opponent’s country had to be
conquered to prevent its citizens from raising new forces and offering renewed
resistance.42 As Jan Willem Honig puts it, “such a definition of the strategic
object . . . possessed the great advantage of providing a seemingly clear-cut
professional remit for the military. Destroying the enemy’s armed forces was
a job they could do independently, without requiring constant political
oversight and inviting potential meddling.”43 Judging from recent
experiences and scholarship alike, the applicability of this prescription in the
contemporary era appears questionable.
40. John Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control: An Analysis of Clausewitz’s Views on the Role
of the Military Advisor in the Development of National Policy,” Armed Forces & Society 42, no. 2 (2016): 259.
41. Jan Willem Honig, “The Future of Military Strategy at Försvarshögskolan: An Attempt to Identify Some
Useful Fundamentals,” Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar Och Tidskrift 1 (2011): 151.
42. Clausewitz, On War, 20–21.
43. Honig, “Future of Military Strategy,” 150.
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Kennan fared little better in addressing the consequences broader strategy
causes to the military profession. While he envisaged political warfare had a
military component, he dodged addressing the role of the military in political
warfare by handing the responsibility over to the Department of State instead
of the Department of Defense.44 This choice made sense because political
warfare too is waged in the gray zone between war and peace. Ultimately,
and against Kennan’s wishes, the Central Intelligence Agency came to answer
for covert operations.45 While the supreme authority of the military continued
in theatres of war, the exact role the military was to play in political warfare
elsewhere was left undefined.
In this sense, Hoffman perhaps comes closest to the mark. Recognizing
the contradiction between Kennan’s and Clausewitz’s understandings of war,
Hoffman saw the main problem with the definition of political warfare was not
only that it employed nonmilitary means, but that they were employed “short
of war”: “if it [is] short of war, then it’s not warfare.”46 Like political warfare
in theatres of war, hybrid war was still war in a way that allowed the military
profession to remain in its traditionally narrow domain.
The problem with Hoffman’s argument is that the concept of hybrid war
has evolved from its original conceptualization. Whereas Hoffman’s concept
focused on combining regular and irregular means and ways predominantly
on the operational level and during times of war, the concept has moved
toward Gerasimov’s and Kennan’s strategic-level emphasis of nonmilitary
means in the gray zone. The shift to the gray zone terminology contains the
core of the issue at stake.
With its main activities lacking violence and taking place outside war,
what role should the military play in such conflict? In other words, the more
contemporary understanding of hybrid war conflates it with gray zone conflict
and makes it impossible to avoid the implications to the military profession.
To offer only one concrete example, the blurred line between war and peace
questions established norms of civil-military relations and the boundaries of
acceptable military action. Even policymakers should be cautious. Equaling
political competition with war risks expanding the military sphere and
militarizing not only foreign policy, but potentially whole societies.

44. Kennan, “Organized Political Warfare,” 2, 6.
45. Office of the Historian, “292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects,” in Foreign
Relations of the United States 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie,
C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996),
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Conclusion
The purpose of Gerasimov’s well-known 2013 presentation was to prod
Russian military experts to think harder. Early on, Gerasimov reasoned
the new context where war is waged leads to logical questions: “What
is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be
armed? Answering these questions will determine the construction and
development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is
essential for military planners to have a clear understanding of the forms and
methods of the application of force.”47
It is uncertain whether Gerasimov’s plea led to substantial action among
Russian scientists or military professionals. One wonders whether we too need
a Gerasimov, someone who recognizes that war and warfare have changed
and who is capable of instigating research about these and related questions.
This article’s conclusions, which deserve to be addressed in future debates,
can be summarized as five points: poor definition of concepts, fixation on
Russia, evolved concepts of hybrid war toward gray zone conflict and political
warfare, insufficiency of narrow military strategy in this kind of war, and the
question of how the military profession can best contribute to waging it.
While hybrid war has entered academic, policy, and public debates, it still
frequently does so in the guise of a poorly defined neologism. In its evolved
form, hybrid war is a buzzword that can mean almost anything. The situation
is only slightly better with gray zone conflict. Like political warfare, both
these concepts are equal to grand strategy in their breadth. While this kind of
conceptual vagueness can explain in part the popularity of these concepts in
policy circles, ambiguity hinders a better understanding of contemporary war
and warfare, and ultimately a better policy. This ambiguity appears unfortunate
and above all unnecessary.
Most discussions of hybrid war continue to revolve around Russia, equating
the concept with its actions and saying little about the world at large. If hybrid
war is something only waged by Russia, then it logically does not describe a
more general type of war. This equation of hybrid war with Russia has also
contributed to a lack of urgency regarding learning to wage this kind of war; if
only Russia wages hybrid war, then we only need to defend ourselves. Our limited
success in combining means of different kinds raises two questions. First, how
has Russia succeeded in mastering this kind of war? Second, do our previous
failures not suggest there is still much to learn? In any case, forfeiting active
strategy risks leaves us as passive defenders of the status quo, not creators of a new
47.
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one. To make matters worse, it is far from certain whether passive strategy can
safeguard our interests.
The hybrid war concept evolved after Hoffman presented it in 2007. As his
later comments demonstrate, his concept focused on the operational level and
gave primacy to military means—use of force—in a context that was clearly a
war. The means are less obvious with the evolved concept that comes closer to
Gerasimov’s notion of a gray zone conflict where nonmilitary means dominate
below the threshold of war. Ultimately, one wonders whether this conceptual
evolution is just rechristened political warfare, a term coined by Kennan
immediately after World War II. Much content in the hybrid war discussions
that concern Russia resembles Cold War debates, and hence risk reinventing
the wheel.48
Regardless of what one calls this kind of war, hybrid war envisages that
military means have lost their primacy in producing political ends. On one
hand, relying on force has become more expensive and hence difficult. On the
other hand, the aims sought in war may not be best delivered through death
and destruction or the threat of it.49 From the strategic theory perspective, this
development must be understood to emphasize grand strategy that applies
all available means at the cost of narrow military strategy that focuses on mere
violence. The use of similar kinds of strategy that sought to tie together various
military and nonmilitary means in Afghanistan suggests inherent challenges.
What most practitioners can agree on, however, is that military means alone will
not suffice when faced with fundamentally political problems.
This discussion suggests it is necessary to go further than Gerasimov and
the Russian military, which appears to have shifted little from its core focus on
conventional warfighting.50 If one accepts the premise that contemporary conflicts
witness a disproportionate use of nonmilitary means against traditional military
ones, does it not logically follow that policymakers and military professionals must
address this development?
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